Se aprecia cómo no toda conducta sexual desordenada desde un punto de vista moral debía ser perseguida jurídicamente, sino tan solo aquellas infracciones que afectaban al fundamento de la sociedad humana, esto es, a la paz social en general, y a la estabilidad matrimonial y familiar en particular, habida cuenta de que el matrimonio era considerado como base de la misma sociedad. Ahí se presta especial atención las razones y argumentos esgrimidos para la persecución y castigo de algunas conductas relacionadas con la moral sexual, y se muestra hasta qué punto se distinguían ambas categorías. Tras la introducción (Parte I), en la segunda se hace un balance historiográfico de la relación entre delito y pecado en los siglos bajomedievales y modernos, centrándose en los «delitos contra la moral». El presente trabajo se divide en tres partes. Así, por ejemplo, una lectura atenta a las clasificaciones llevadas a cabo por Montesquieu resulta más que suficiente para percatarse que los delitos relacionados con la moral sexual no fueron calificados o etiquetados como «sexualidades criminales» o «delitos sexuales», sino como delitos contra «la moral», «el orden público» o la «seguridad del individuo». Esta práctica, además de llevar consigo los perniciosos efectos de la Dogmengeschichte, también dificulta la tarea de distinguir las nociones de delito y pecado en la ciencia jurídica anterior a la codificación decimonónica. Estas expresiones, desconocidas casi por completo en los textos medievales y modernos reflejan, a mi juicio, una aproximación al estudio de la historia desde categorías modernas (en este caso, desde los actuales «delitos contra la libertad sexual»).
Las expresiones «delitos sexuales» («sex crimes») y «sexualidades criminales» («criminal sexualities») no resultan extrañas en la historiografía penal española y europea. I will finish with some concluding considerations (III). After the Introduction (I), the paper will explore the Spanish historiography on this matter in a European context (II.1), paying particular attention to Belgium (II.2) and Romania (II.3). The consequences of such an approach have been notable in describing the codification of all legal branches, particularly in the civil law domain. In the end, it seems that the view of codification as a means of denationalisation of law has prevailed, giving either a biased and partisan view of codification, or simplifying its richness. This debate has been particularly present in the Spanish scholarship. Different perspectives and arguments may lead to completely opposite outcomes.
On the other hand, the fact that national parliaments enacted codes whose content had been highly influenced by foreign codes reveals that codification also contributed to the denationalisation of law. On the one hand, the fact that laws needed to be approved by national parliaments and the ius commune – which was somehow regarded as a foreign law – ceased to be in force, gives evidence of how much codification contributed to the nationalisation of law. Some scholars have presented codification as a means to both nationalise and denationalise European legal traditions. The chapter aims at dispelling this common place, and particularly the myth of the overall French influence in Europe and Latin America. The main consequences of this fact are twofold: (i) 19th century criminal jurisprudence is sometimes presented as if had arisen out of the blue, or as if institutions contained in the 19th criminal codes broke with the past or bore no traces of Roman law and (ii) since criminal codes supposedly broke with the past, the extent and scope of foreign influences-and the French in particular-on the criminal codes in Europe and Latin America are overemphasized. The civil law tradition has doubtlessly committed more effort to the scholarly development of private law institutions than to those of public law, privileging civil law over criminal law. However, there is no such consensus about criminal law.
#ACTIO LIBERA IN CAUSA EJEMPLOS CODE#
Any civil law student knows that most of provisions in any European or Latin American civil code derive from Roman law, that they were the outcome of a long and gradual scholarly elaboration extending from 12th century glossators to the natural lawyers of the 18th century.
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